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Abstract—Contingency Analysis (CA) is a core component of
the Energy Management System (EMS) in the power grid. The
goal of CA is to operate the power system in a secure manner by
analyzing the system subject to a contingency (e.g., the outage
of a transmission line or a power generator) to determine the
set points that will allow system operation without violation
of constraints. The analysis in CA is conducted based on the
output from State Estimation (SE), another core EMS module.
However, it is also shown that an adversary can alter certain
power measurements to corrupt the system states estimated by SE
without being detected. Such a corrupted estimation can severely
skew the results of the contingency analysis as it will provide a
fake model to deal with. In this research, we formally model nec-
essary interdependency relationships and systematically analyze
these novel attacks on the contingency analysis. In particular,
this research focuses on Security Constrained Optimal Power
Flow (SCOPF) that finds out the optimal economic dispatches
considering a single line failure (based on the n− 1 contingency
analysis) and transmission line capacities. The proposed model
is implemented and solved to find out potential threat vectors
(i.e., a set of measurements to be altered) that can evade CA so
that the system will face overloading situation on one or more
transmission lines when some specific contingencies happen. We
demonstrate our formal model on an IEEE 14 bus system-based
case study and verify the results with a standard PowerWorld
model. We further evaluate the model with respect to various
attacks and grid characteristics.
Index Terms—Power Grid; Security Constrained Optimal
Power Flow; Formal Model
I. INTRODUCTION
With the advances in various communication technologies
and improved intelligence in physical control devices, Cyber-
Physical Systems (CPSs) emerged as complex systems that can
connect legacy control systems with the cyber world enabling
two-way flow of information [1], [2]. Power grids are perfect
examples of CPSs where cyber technologies are increasingly
being used for smarter operations, economic advantages, and
efficient management. However, these smarter grids are grow-
ingly becoming vulnerable to cyber attacks.
In a power grid, Energy Management System (EMS) refers
to a set of modules used by Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) system for system wide data analysis,
control, and operation. A schematic diagram of EMS is shown
in Fig. 1 [3]. State Estimation (SE) estimates the system
state variables from a set of real-time SCADA data (i.e.,
power measurements and breaker/switch statuses). The states
‡Rahman and Shahriar are the co-first authors of this paper.
Fig. 1. A shematic of Energy control center system security schematic [3]
are used to compute the unknown power measurements as
well as to rectify the received measurements. As seen in
Fig. 1, the modules are interdependent, i.e., the output of
one module, e.g., SE, is required by several other modules,
including Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow (SCOPF),
for economic dispatch calculation and security assessment.
Therefore, a problem in one module cascades to other EMS
operations, causing an ultimate failure.
It has been shown that stealthy attacks can negatively affect
the performance of the state estimation solver, often named
as Undetected False Data Injection (UFDI) attacks, where
adversaries can corrupt the SE solution by injecting false
data to the measurements while remaining undetected [4]. The
basis of these types of attacks is to alter the measurements
intelligently considering being consistent with the power sys-
tem balances. In SE, a bad data detection (BDD) mechanism
is traditional which utilizes redundant measurements to filter
out erroneous meter measurements by checking the difference
between observed and estimated measurements [5], [6]. An ad-
versary with sufficient knowledge of the measurement model
can manipulate measurements and bypass BDD [4].
This paper aims at understanding the effects of UFDI attacks
on CA, focusing on SCOPF. As shown in Fig. 1, SCOPF
determines the set-points of the generators for Automatic
Generation Control (AGC). SCOPF allocates the best set-
points by minimizing the generation cost while satisfying the
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system constraints. One of the most important constraints is
the safety of the transmission lines when any line trips by
conducting CA.
The measurements are sent from the field devices through
different communication channels to SE for estimating the
whole grid. False measurements can mislead the estimation
and so the SCOPF solution. As a result, no longer secured for
the system. For instance, SCOPF can select an insecure set
of generation which will run without any constraint violation
but may overload some transmission lines if any contingency
happens. However, these attacks must bypass BDD to remain
stealthy, while the attacker cannot exceeds its capability.
Exploring these attack vectors is an important challenge.
Considering this prime challenge, we introduce a framework
capable of systematically analyzing the influence of UFDI
attacks on CA/SCOPF of a power grid. Our contributions in
this paper are as follows:
• We propose a formal framework to analyse the impact of
false data injection attacks on SCOPF. This framework
consists of modeling of the power system including
SE and SCOPF, UFDI attacks, adversaries capabilities,
and impact on SCOPF. In FDI attacks, line and bus
power measurements are attacked to introduce changed
power consumption at different buses. Based on wrong
consumption data, the system calculates the SCOPF and
run accordingly which is not optimal in reality.
• A Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver is used
to implement the proposed framework. We model this
framework as a constraint satisfaction problem [7]. We
evaluate the implemented tool and analyze the threat
space according to different attack models.
The remaining parts of this paper are organized as follows:
Section II presents background information and introduces an
example of the attack model. Section III contains formalization
of attacks and their impact on SCOPF. Evaluation results
are discussed in Section IV. The related work is concisely
reviewed in Section V. Conclusion is presented in VI.
II. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Here we discuss necessary background information related
to this research.
A. DC Power Flow
The most common and important calculation for a power
system is the AC power flow analysis. However, an AC power
flow analysis is computationally expensive as a grid with n
nodes need to solve 2n non-linear equations through iteration.
The high level of accuracy with a detailed result provided
by the AC power flow model does not overcome the high
computational expense. Therefore, a linearized model of the
system is used to speed up the computation which is called DC
power flow model [8]. To make the model less expensive, some
assumptions are made which speed up the computation with
the trade of accuracy. However, the result of the DC power
model is accurate enough the load flow calculation. The DC
power flow model is discussed further in Appendix A for the
interested readers.
B. State Estimation and Stealthy Attacks
State estimation of DC power flow model estimates the
phase angles of the nodes from the several transmission line
power flow measurements. Specially, to estimate n number of
states variables x = (x1, x2, · · · , xn)T , m number of meter
measurements z = (z1, z2, · · · , zm)T are used [6]. As for
the assumptions of the DC power flow model discussed in
section II-A, the measurement model is linear and hence the
measurement model can be written as:
z = Hx+ e, where H = (hi,j)m×n
While n number of measurements are sufficient to calcu-
late the states, usually m >> n, which indicates that the
measurement set includes redundant measurements. The gross
measurement errors are detected, removed and smoothed by
the redundancy. Considering Gaussian distribution for the the
measurement error with zero mean and known deviation, the
state estimation xˆ is given as:
xˆ = (HTWH)−1HTWz (1)
Here, W is a diagonal “weighting” matrix whose elements
are reciprocals of variances of the meter errors. Thus, the
measurement values can be calculated by Hxˆ when ||z−Hxˆ||
provides the measurement residual. Considering τ as the
threshold for the errors, any data satisfying ||z−Hxˆ|| > τ is
detected as a bad data.
While injecting false data into the system, the bad data
detection process can be bypassed by generating attack vectors
accordingly [4]. A random value of false data a can be injected
to the measurements z so that a is a linear combination
of the column vectors of H such as a = Hc where c is
added to the original state estimate xˆ to avoid the injection
of a into the measurements. Since z + a = H(xˆ + c), the
residual ||(z + a) − H(xˆ + c)|| still remains the same as
||z−Hxˆ|| and the bad data injection is not detected. Note
that this requires knowledge of H, i.e., full knowledge of
system topology, parameters and measurement configuration.
The same approach is used to bypass the UFDI into the system
to attack the contingency analysis of the power grids.
C. Security Constrained Optimal Power Flow
The goal of the SCOPF algorithm is to minimize the total
generation cost by adjusting different system controls while
satisfying power balance constraints imposing the elements’
maximum rated capacities. However, the secure and reliable
operation of the power system expects no uncontrollable situ-
ations during the contingencies. In order to make the system
secure, the optimization of the cost function is needed to
consider the contingency scenarios as an additional constraint.
This procedure is called SCOPF algorithm. The SCOPF algo-
rithm adjusts the control settings during the pre-contingency
condition in order to avoid interruption in the post-contingency
conditions.
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Consequently, SCOPF algorithm intends to minimize the to-
tal cost of generation satisfying the constraints: (i) the equality
of total power generation and consumption (ii) the equipment
ratings, transmission line capacity limits and control variables
both in pre-contingency and post-contingency conditions [9].
Considering the cost of generation of generator k by Ck(PGk ),
where Ck has two parts: fixed cost and variable cost both
depending on the nature of plant (e.g., type of fuel, type of
machine, type of cycle, etc.).
Thus, the SCOPF algorithm (with the DC flow model) can
be described as follows:
Power Flow Constraint: [B][θ] = [P] (2)
Line Flow Limit (pre-contingency): |Pi| ≤ Pmaxi (3)
Line Flow Limit (post-contingency): |P(i,j)| ≤ Pmaxi (4)
Equipment Rating: Pmink ≤ Pk ≤ Pmaxk (5)
Optimization Goal: min
∑
k
Ck(Pk) s.t. (6)
Here, the power flow limit for line i when line j is tripped is
shown in Equation 4, equipment (i.e., generator, transformer)
rating constraint is shown in Equation 5. Finally, the optimiza-
tion target is to minimize the cost of operation (Equation 6).
D. Attack Model
In this work, cyber attacks on the base of FDI is considered
in order to assess their impact on SCOPF. The false data
can be injected by compromising the corresponding sensor
or meter during the transmission of the data, as a man-in-the-
middle attack. The sensors are located at the bus or the remote
terminal unit (RTU).
The parameters of the attack model mainly consists of the
attacker’s resources, accessibility, and being informed of the
system. Physical or remote access to some of the measure-
ments can be restricted to the attacker. Therefore, to inject the
false data, the attacker should be able to access the substation
or the corresponding RTU. Some of the measurements may be
secured. An adversary also needs to have necessary knowledge
of the grid, in particular the bus topology and the transmission
lines’ electrical properties (e.g., impedances). Furthermore, an
adversary might be limited in terms of cost or difficulties
of launching attacks on highly scattered measurements. It is
harder for an attacker to inject false data to highly scattered
measurements than measurements distributed in a less number
of substations.
E. An Example of FDI Attack on SCOPF
To understand the FDI attack on SCOPF, consider a simple 3
bus power system where all the buses have both generator and
load and are interconnected to each other through transmission
lines as shown in Fig. 2. Table I shows the bus and line
parameters. The rated loads of buses 1, 2, and 3 are 1000 MW,
1000 MW, and 1500 MW, respectively, while their current
loads are 800 MW, 800 MW, and 1400 MW, respectively. The
rated generation of the buses is 2000 MW, 1500 MW, and 500
MW, respectively. The cost coefficients pairs of the generators
are (10, 1), (10, 2), and (10,3) respectively. Line 1 connects
Fig. 2. 3 bus power system
TABLE I
BUS AND LINE PARAMETERS OF 3 BUS POWER SYSTEM
Bus Data Bus 1 Bus 2 Bus 3
Rated Load (MW) 1000 1000 1500
Current Load (MW) 800 800 1400
Generation Capacity (MW) 2000 1500 500
Cost Coefficients ($, $/MW) (10, 1) (10, 2) (10, 3)
SCOPF Dispatch (MW) 1800 1000 200
Line Data Line 1 Line 2 Line 3
Connecting Buses 1, 2 1, 3 2, 3
Rated Capacity (MW) 1100 1200 1200
Current Line Flow (MW) 508 492 708
Percent of overloading (%) 46 41 59
bus 1 and 2, line 2 connects bus 1 and 3 and line 3 connect bus
2 and 3. The rated capacities of the transmission lines are 1100
MW, 1200 MW, and 1200 MW, respectively. Thus, in the pre-
attack (no attack) condition, the SCOPF dispatches are 1800
MW, 1000 MW, and 200 MW, respectively with a generation
cost of $4,430. The line flows without any contingency are
508 MW, 492 MW, and 708 MW, respectively.
As the system running on the SCOPF solution, if any line
trips the system should sustain and continue the operation.
The three contingency conditions when line 1, 2, or 3 trips
are shown in Fig. 3. From the figure, we see that all the line
flows are within the threshold capacity limit, which ensures
that the system sustains even when any line trips.
At this point, the attacker injects some false data into the
system in a way that the EMS observes 200 MW of load
increase in bus 1. In fact, it is a load shift/redistribution from
buses 2 and 3 to bus 1. Thus, the system now expects 1000
MW in bus 1, 700 MW in bus 2, and 1300 MW in bus 3.
Based on the false load data, the system will calculate the
new set of generations following the SCOPF algorithm. Thus,
after running the SCOPF on the false data, the new generation
dispatches are 2000 MW, 900 MW, and 100 MW, respectively.
Again with the attacked false data, the system expects that
all line flows will be placed within the capacity limit during
normal and contingency conditions. Fig. 4 shows the different
scenarios expected by EMS during the contingencies. With the
new generation dispatches, the total cost is $4,130 which is
lower than the pre-attack cost.
However, the actual values are still the same as the pre-
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Fig. 3. Contingency scenarios of pre-attack condition : (a) no contingency, (b) line 1 trips, and (c) line 2 trips (d) line 3 trips.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 4. Expected contingency scenarios after the attack: (a) no contingency, (b) line 1 trips, and (c) line 2 trips (d) line 3 trips.
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Fig. 5. Post attack contingency scenarios with real data: (a) no contingency, (b) line 1 trips, and (c) line 2 trips (d) line 3 trips.
attack condition, misguiding the system to run on another
set point which is not optimal anymore. The real loads are
still the same but the generation dispatches are different from
the optimum values. Thus, the system will run at a different
condition than the expected one. Fig.5 shows the scenarios
that the system observes during normal and contingency
conditions. It can be seen that, though during the normal
operation of the system there is no line overloading if one of
the lines is tripped. It is shown that tripping of line 1 does not
create any overloading among other lines. However, when line
2 trips, line 1 and line 3 get overloaded by 109% and 107%.
Moreover, when line 3 trips, line 2 becomes overloaded by
107% where the EMS is expecting no overloading.
III. FORMAL MODEL FOR SYNTHESIZING UFDI ATTACKS
THAT IMPACTS SCOPF
In this section, we first briefly discuss the basic
idea/framework of verifying the impact of stealthy attacks on
SCOPF. Then, we discuss the corresponding formalization in
detail. Finally, we demonstrate the execution of the proposed
formal framework on some example cases.
A
Stealthy Attack Model
Is 
There any Attack 
Vector? 
SCOPF Model wtih 
Attacked Load
Attack 
Attributes
Attack Goal
Add a 
Constraint
Any 
Overloading 
During Contingencies 
(with Actual 
Load)?
No
Success
Fail
Yes
Yes
Any 
Increase in in 
SCOPF Generation 
Cost? 
No
Yes
No
Fig. 6. The systematic flow of finding the impact of UFDI attacks on SCOPF.
The proposed formal model unifies this concept in a single model.
A. Framework
The synthesis of a stealthy attack that impact/compromise
CA/SCOPF follows the idea presented in Fig. 6. The idea
is composed of two basic formal model: UFDI attack model
that finds potential attack vectors corresponding and SCOPF
model that verifies if there exists an SCOPF solution within
a threshold cost. The objective is to launch an stealthy attack
on CA without increasing the generation cost.
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TABLE II
MODELING PARAMETERS
Notation Definition
b Bus numbers in the grid.
l Line numbers in the grid topology.
fi from-bus of line i.
ei to-bus of line i.
di Line i admittance.
PLi Line i power flow.
PBj Bus j power consumption.
θj The state value, i.e., the voltage phase angle at bus j.
n Number of states.
m Number of possible measurements.
ai Whether measurement i is required to be altered for the attack.
cj Whether state j is corrupted due to false data injection.
hj Whether any measurement collected at bus j is needs an
alteration for the attack.
ti If potential measurement i is taken (i.e., recorded/reported by
a meter).
ri Whether the attacker can access measurement i.
si Whether measurement i is secured.
δb maximum false data of the as bus load.
δl minimum overloading of the lines during contingencies.
øik Whether line i get overloaded when line k trips.
Impact analysis includes a couple of stages: First, we try
to find an attack vector that satisfies the attack model (i.e.,
attack attributes). When there is an attack vector, the system
is (incorrectly) updated according to the attack vector, i.e., with
the consideration of the changed loads. Then, the generation
cost is evaluated by executing the SCOPF model to see if
there is any increase in the generation cost with respect to
the original (i.e., no-attack) scenario. If no, then the attack
was successful. Otherwise, the same steps will be taken to
find a new attack vector until either we find an attack vector
or no more attack vectors exist. As mentioned earlier, the
objective is to overload some lines during contingency while
the generation cost remains unchanged (i.e., no significant
cost difference). The formal model presented in the following
subsection unifies the conceptual building blocks (as shown in
Fig. 6) into a single model.
B. Formalization
The notations used for UFDI attack modeling on contin-
gency analysis are defined in Table II.
Pre-attack Case with the SCOPF Model:
To model power flow analysis, we used DC power flow
model. According to the discussion, transmission lines are
considered lossless thus the admittance is calculated only
from the reactance. We denote the power flow through line
i using PLi and the admittance of the line using di. The buses
connected through the line i where are indicated by fi (from-
bus) and ei (to-bus) where 1 ≤ i ≤ l, 1 ≤ fi, ei ≤ b, and b
represents the number of buses. The basic power flow equation
is shown in Equation (7). Here θj represents the state of bus
j which is the phase angle. Therefore, θfi and θei denote
the phase angles of the buses fi and ei, respectively. The
equation specifies that power flow PLi is dependent on the
difference between the connected buses’ phase angles and line
admittances. As in the DC model, each state corresponds to a
bus, so the number of states n is equal to b.
TABLE III
FORMALIZATION OF PRE-ATTACK POWER BALANCES
Line Power Flow:
∀1≤i≤l PLi = di(θfi − θei ) (7)
Bus Power Consumption:
∀1≤j≤b PBj =
∑
i∈Lj,in
PLi −
∑
i∈Lj,out
PLi (8)
∀1≤j≤b PBj = PDj − PGj (9)
Load and Generation Limit:
∀1≤j≤b Pj,min ≤ PDj ≤ PDj,max (10)
∀1≤j≤b (PGj,min ≤ PGj ≤ PGj,max) ∨ (PGj = 0) (11)
Contingency Line Flow using LODF
∀1≤i≤l∀1≤k≤l PL(i, k) = PLi + PLk × LODFki (12)
Line Power Limit (Pre-contingency & Post-contingency Periods):
∀1≤i≤l |PLi | ≤ PLi,max (13)
∀1≤i≤l∀1≤k≤l |PL(i, k)| ≤ PLi,max (14)
SCOPF Generation Cost:
TSCOPF =
∑
1≤j≤b
C(PGj ) (15)
Let PBj be the power consumption of bus j which is the
summation of the power flows of the lines connected to this
bus. Let Lj,in and Lj,out be the sets of incoming and outgoing
lines of bus j, respectively. The Equation (8) shows the power
consumption at bus j. The power consumption at a bus is also
equal to the load at the bus minus the power injected to the
bus by the generators connected to this bus. The Equation (9)
shows the power consumption, where PGj and P
D
j denote the
generated power and load power of bus j, respectively. If no
generator is connected to bus j, then PGj = 0. Similarly, if no
load is presented at bus j, then PDj = 0. The load of the bus
j should be within the rated capacity. Considering PDj,min and
PDj,max as the minimum and maximum limit for the load at bus
j, Equation (10) shows the constraint for the limit. Besides, the
generators also have to maintain the rated capacity. As for the
Equation (11), given PGj,min and P
G
j,max as the minimum and
maximum generation capacity of the generators, the output
should be within these operating limits while running.
If line k trips, the post fault power flow through line i is
represented as PL(i,k) which calculated using Equation (12).
Here, LODF ki represents the line outage distribution faction
(LODF) of line i when line k trips. Interested readers can find a
brief discussion about LODF calculation in Appendix B. Each
transmission line has a limited power flow capacity. Assume
PLi,max as the line upower flow capacity. Therefore Equation
(13) shows the line power flow capacity limit for each line.
As the system is running on SCOPF, all the contingency
conditions are considered during the optimization process.
Thus, as per Equation (14) when the line k trips, power flow
through any line i should be within the rated capacity.
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TABLE IV
FORMALIZATION OF ATTACK ATTRIBUTES
Line Power Flow:
∀1≤i≤l (∆PLi 6= 0)→ (ti → ai) ∧ (tl+i → al+i)
∀1≤j≤b (∆PBj 6= 0)→ (t2l+j → a2l+j)
(16)
Attack Plan Properties:
∀1≤i≤l ai → ti ∧ (∆PLi 6= 0)
∀1≤i≤l al+i → tl+i ∧ (∆PLi 6= 0)
∀1≤j≤b a2l+j → t2l+j ∧ (∆PBj 6= 0)
∀1≤j≤n cj → (∆θj 6= 0)
(17)
Attack Access Capability:
∀1≤i≤m ai → ri ∧ ¬si (18)
Attack Resources
∀1≤i≤l ai → hfi
∀1≤i≤l al+i → hei
∀1≤j≤b a2l+j → hj
(19)
∑
1≤j≤b
hj ≤ TB (20)
Let Cj(.) denote the cost function of the generator connected
to bus j, which takes the total power generated as the input
and returns the cost. Usually, Cj(.) is a strictly increasing
convex function. The cost function in this paper is considered
as Cj(PˆGj ) = α + βPˆGj , where α and β represent the cost-
coefficients for a specific generator. SCOPF finds the optimum
set of a generation with the minimum generation cost, TSCOPF
as shown in Equation(15).
Attack Attributes — CPS Attack Mapping:
In the DC model, two measurements, forward and backward
line power flows, can be measured for each line. Also, power
consumption can be measured for each bus. Therefore, for
a power system with l number of lines and b number of
buses, there is 2l + b (i.e., m = 2l + b) number of potential
measurements at most. Note that forward and backward power
flows of the line i are denoted with the index i and l + i
respectively, while power consumption of bus j is shown with
the index 2l + j.
False Data Injection to Measurements:
Assume ∆PLi as the change in line i power flow mea-
surement. According to the Equation (8), ∆PBj at bus j
depends on the changes made in power flow measurements
of the lines connected to the bus j. ∆PLi 6= 0 specifies
that if measurements i and l + i corresponding to line i are
taken (i.e., ti and tl+i), they are required to be changed
by ∆PLi . Likewise, the power consumption measurement at
bus j is required to be changed when ∆PBj 6= 0 and it is
taken. These conditions can be formalized as Equations (17).
Conversely, measurement i is altered, if it is taken and the
corresponding power measurement is changed. This constraint
can be formalized as Equation (16).
Attacker’s physical or remote access to the measurements
are of the key factors to false data injection to a measurement.
TABLE V
FORMALIZATION OF FDI ATTACK ON PHYSICAL SYSTEM
Attacked Line Power Flow:
∀1≤i≤l ∆PLi = di(∆θfi −∆θei ) (21)
∀1≤i≤l P¯Li = PLi + ∆PLi (22)
Attacked Bus and Load Data:
∀1≤j≤b ∆PBj =
∑
i∈Lj,in
∆PLi −
∑
i∈Lj,out
∆PLi (23)
∀1≤j≤b ∆PBj = ∆PDj (24)
∀1≤j≤b P¯Dj = PDj + ∆PDj (25)
∀1≤j≤b PD,minj ≤ P¯Dj ≤ PD,maxj (26)
Limit of Load Injection :
∀1≤j≤b | ∆PDj | ≤ PDj × δb (27)
However, if a measurement is secured (i.e., data integrity
protected) the FDI attack will not be successful even if the
attacker has access to the measurement. Hence, the attacker
will only be able to change the measurement i if Equation
(18) becomes true. Due to limitation, an attacker is able to
attack only some of the substations at a particular time. In
case a measurement of a substation needs to be changed
that substation must be either compromised or accessed. This
constraint is represented in Equation (19). Let TB be the
maximum number of compromisable substations, then the
number of compromised substation should be within TB as
shown in Equation (20) .
Impact of FDI Attack on the SCOPF:
From Equation (7) it is clear that, a change of PLi needs to
change based on the changes in the state fi (θfi ) and/or state
ei (θei ) or vice versa. Thus, ∆P
L
i is calculated from Equation
(21). If ∆θfi 6= 0 (or ∆θei 6= 0), then it is obvious that state
fi (or ei) is changed (i.e., infected). However, if both of the
states change equally, ∆PLi still remains zero. As shown in
the Equation (22) the attacked line power P¯Li is the summation
of original line power PLi and the injected amount ∆P
L
i . Any
variable with the notation (¯) over it indicates that, the amount
is injected through the FDI attack, which may not be equal to
the actual (field) value.
The change in the bus consumption ∆PBj due to attack
is represented by the Equation (23) which is the sum of
changes in the power flow of connected lines. According
to Equation (9), ∆PBj 6= 0 means that there is a power
generation and/or load change at the bus. In this paper, it
is assumed that any change in a bus power consumption
measurement can only be made though a change in the load;
in other words ∆PGj = 0. Therefore, changes in the bus
power consumption specifies the load changes in those buses
as shown in Equation (24). This is due to the fact that,
generator power measurements are pretty much well-defined
and are changeable only by the grid operators. Usually, after
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TABLE VI
FORMALIZATION OF GENERATION DISPATCHES ON CORRUPTED LOAD
Updated Generation: ∑
1≤j≤b
PˆGj =
∑
1≤j≤b
P¯Dj (28)
Generation Limit:
∀1≤j≤b (PGj,min ≤ PˆGj ≤ PGj,max) ∨ (PˆGj = 0) (29)
Power Flow Constraints:
∀1≤j≤b P¯Bj = P¯Dj − PˆGj
∀1≤j≤b P¯Bj =
∑
i∈Lj,in
P¯Li −
∑
i∈Lj,out
P¯Li
∀1≤i≤l ∆P¯Li = di(∆θ¯fi −∆θ¯ei )
(30)
Expected Line Power Flow (Pre-contingency & Post-contingency Periods):
∀1≤i≤l∀1≤k≤l P¯L(i, k) = P¯Li + P¯Lk × LODFki
∀1≤i≤l P¯Li ≤ PLi,max
∀1≤i≤l∀1≤k≤l P¯Li,k ≤ PLi,max
(31)
SCOPF Generation Cost Limit:∑
1≤j≤b
Cj(PˆGj ) ≤ TSCOPF (32)
performing the state estimation, if there are any load changes,
SCOPF is performed and the result would determine whether
(and which) changes in the generation are necessary for the
optimal operation. As shown in the Equation (25), the attacked
bus load P¯Dj is the summation of original bus load P
D
j and
the injected false load, ∆PDj .
Though properly injected any large abrupt change in the
measurement will bypass the bad data detector, however, may
create suspicion to the system operator. Thus to make the
attack stealthy enough, the change in the bus load is limited to
a certain percent of the original load. The Equation (27) shows
that the changed bus load ∆PDj is within the δb percent of
the pre-attack value. Besides, the total attacked load is within
the rated limit as shown in Equation (26)
Running SCOPF on Corrupted Loads
Due to the state estimation of attacked load data, consider
PˆGj as the altered power generation by the generator connected
at j which follows the equality of the generation and expected
load as shown in Equation (28). Here any character with the
notation ( ˆ ) represents the actual filed data after the attack.
Again, the generation PˆGj is withing the rated generation limit
as per the Equation (29).
Considering this scenario, let θ¯, and P¯Bj be the expected
phase angle and the power consumption at bus j, respectively.
All of the power-flow equations in (30) are considered as
constraints of SCOPF with expected attacked load and new
generation. As the system is running on SCOPF, all the
expected line power flows during both pre-contingency and
post-contingency must be within the threshold as shown in
Equation (31). Here P¯Li,k denotes the power flow through line
i when like k trips which is calculated using the LODF matrix.
TABLE VII
FORMALIZATION OF GENERATION DISPATCHES ON ACTUAL LOADS
Bus Power Consumption:
∀1≤j≤b PˆBj = PDj − PˆGj
∀1≤j≤b PˆBj =
∑
i∈Lj,in
PˆLi −
∑
i∈Lj,out
PˆLi
(33)
Actual Line Power Flow:
∀1≤i≤l PˆLi = di(θˆfi − θˆei ) (34)
Attacker’s Goal on Line Power Flow (Pre-contingency & Post-contingency
Periods):
∀1≤i≤l |PˆLi | ≤ PLi,max (35)
∀1≤i≤l∀1≤k≤l PˆL(i, k) = PˆLi + PˆLk × LODFki
∀1≤i≤l øik → |PˆL(i, j)| > PLi,max × δl∑
1≤i≤l
∑
1≤k≤l
øi,k ≥ TL
(36)
The attacker’s target is not to increase the generation cost.
Thus the total cost should be less or equal to the pre-attack
generation cost. Thus Equation (32) shows the cost constraint
with the new set of generations.
Sub-optimal Generation Dispatches for Actual Loads and
Ultimate Attack Goal:
The generations are updated by EMS to optimize the system
which is done based on the false load data. However, the
actual loads are still the same as the pre-attack condition which
is PDj . Thus, the system is now running with the inaccurate
generation PˆGj which is not optimal anymore. After the attack,
considering PˆBj be the actual bus consumption, the SCOPF
constraints with actual data are shown in Equation (33).
Now the attacker’s goal is not to overload any line during
the normal operation as shown in Equation (35). However,
the attacker’s ultimate target is to overload the lines during
any contingency condition. Thus, if line k trips, few lines
will be overloaded by δl percentage among the rest of the
running lines. The attacker’s goal is to overload a minimum
number of TL lines when any contingency happens. This target
is formalized in Equation (36).
C. Implementation
The entire constraints as well as the system configuration
are encode into SMT [10]. Z3 .Net API [7] is used for
encoding the formalization of the proposed FDI model. The
formalizations is mainly encoded using Boolean (i.e., for
logical constraints) and Real (e.g., for the relation between
power flows or consumption with states) terms. A text file
(input file) is used to import the system configurations and
constraints.
The verification result of the model execution in Z3 is as
either satisfiable (sat) or unsatisfiable (unsat). The unsat result
means that there is no attack vector for the problem that
satisfies the constraints. If the result is sat, the attack vector
is extracted from the assignments of the variables, ais (and/or
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Fig. 7. IEEE 14-bus test system topology [11]. The buses, transmission lines,
and measurements are numbered.
his), which show the set of measurements to be altered (or
the set of buses to be compromised).
D. Example Case Studies
Here, we present a few cases to demonstrate our the
execution of our proposed formal model to identify UFDI
attacks impacting contingency analysis. In these examples,
IEEE 14-bus system (Fig. 7) is studied.
Input:
The input line information consists of a set of data for
each of the lines such as line admittance, line number, end
buses (from-bus and to-bus), line capacity (i.e., the maximum
possible line power flow). According to the input, line 1
connects buses 1 and 2, which has an admittance of 16.90
and the rated capacity is 0.65 per unit (pu) (100 MVA Base).
Appendix C (Table VIII) shows partially the input file for the
interested readers.
The input includes necessary information about the buses.
The generation boundaries of the generators corresponding
to the buses are given. It is assumed that a generation bus
has only one generator. The generation power cost function
is considered the one shown in Section III-B. Coefficients α
and β related to the generators are provided in the input. Note
that these coefficient values are considered randomly. The total
load of the system is 2.45 pu, (i.e., 245 MW, considering a
100 MVA base).
Since the example bus system has 14 buses and 20 lines, the
maximum number of potential measurements is (14 + 2×20)
or 54. Each row of the measurement information includes (i)
whether the measurement is taken for state estimation (ii)
whether the measurement is secured and (iii) whether the
attacker has the accessibility to alter the measurement. The
example input file indicates that the measurement 1 is taken,
not secured and can be altered by the attacker. The first 20
measurements represent the forward power flow, the following
20 measurements represent the backward power flow of the
20 lines, and the rest 14 measurements represent the power
consumption of the 14 buses.
The cost constraint in the attack-free condition is $382,
which means according to the current load scenario the SCOPF
cost is $382. The attack vector should find a solution with a
generation cost not more than this cost.
The attacker is allowed to attack up-to 20 measurements
those can be distributed among maximum 3 different buses.
According to the input, while attacking the measurements the
changes in bus consumption should be within the 20% of
the original consumption. Finally, the attacker’s target is to
find an attack vector which will create 5% overloading in 5%
transmission lines during the contingency condition.
Case Study 1:
In this example, the attacker’s objective is to launch a false
data injection attack by shifting the loads among the few
buses so that system runs at a new operating point where
generation cost is not increased but one or more lines will
be overloaded if any line trips. Here the attacker has access
to all the measurements and none of them are secure means
he can inject false data to any of the 54 measurements. The
changes in the bus load are limited to 20% of the original bus
load and the target is to overload 5% of the total lines (i.e., one
line) and the overloading amount should be at least 5% of the
rated capacity. The execution of the model corresponding to
this example returns unsat, specifying that there is no attack
vector which satisfies the attacker’s goal by only attacking
measurements maximum in 2 buses. The reason behind is that
all of the buses except bus 8 are connected to other two or
more buses. Thus attacking the state of any of the buses needs
to adjust the power flow of the lines connected to that bus. As
those lines are connected to at least two different neighboring
buses, the measurements in those buses also need to be altered.
Besides, bus 8 is the only bus that is connected to only one
bus (bus 7). However, as none of the buses have a load, a false
data injection attack is not possible. Therefore, a UFDI attack
in the measurements distributed in a maximum of two buses
is not possible.
Case Study 2:
In this example, the same attributes used for case study 1
were kept, except a change in the attacker’s capability to attack
the measurements. Thus, the attacker has more capability and
attacked measurements are distributed in maximum 3 buses
instead of 2. After executing the model for this example, the
results show a sat along with returning the assignments to
different variables. From these assignments, it is observable
that:
• Before the attack, the SCOPF solution has a generation
cost of $382 where buses 2,3, and 4 generate 0.284 pu,
0.944 pu, and 1.220 pu, respectively.
• To achieve the attacker’s goals, it is required to launch a
UFDI attack on state 3.
• For keeping the attack undetected, measurements 3, 6,
23, 26, 42, 43 and 44 requires to be changed. Thus, the
8
(a) (b)
Fig. 8. Power flow of the attack vector for Case Study 2 (a) attacked load: No overloading (b) actual load: line 6 trips, line 3 gets overloaded
(a) (b)
Fig. 9. Power flow of the attack vector for Case Study 3 (a) attacked load: No overloading (b) actual load: line 7 trips, line 1, 2, 5 and 6 get overloaded
attacker needs to inject false on the measurements of line
3 and 6 and buses 2, 3, and 4 given they all are distributed
in bus 2, 3, and 4.
• From the attack vector, we also see that to attack the state
at bus 3, load at bus 3 increases by 0.08 pu and loads
at bus 2 and 4 are decreased by 0.037 pu and 0.043 pu
respectively. Thus bus load at bus 2, 3 and 4 are changed
from 0.8 pu to 0.88 pu, from 0.217 to 0.18 and from
0.478 pu to 0.435 pu, respectively.
• According to the attacked load scenario, the system cal-
culates the new set of generation dispatches by executing
SCOPF. Generators 2, 3, and 6 changes their output from
0.284 pu to 0.196 pu, from 0.944 pu to 1.027 pu, and
from 1.220 pu to 1.225 pu, respectively. The new set of
dispatch has a generation cost of $380 which is less than
the pre-attack SCOPF generation cost.
• With false load data and the new set of generations, all
the expected line power flows calculated by the EMS are
within the rated capacity during the normal condition and
the contingency conditions.
• However, the loads are actually still the same as the pre-
attack condition but the generators have changed output
that is not optimal anymore. Thus the real power flow
through the lines is different than the expected ones.
Although the actual line power flows are within the rated
capacity during the normal condition, when line 3 trips,
the power flow through line 6 becomes 0.227 pu where
the rated capacity of the line is 0.20 pu. The overloading
amount is 13.5%, and thus line 3 will trip as soon as line
6 trips which is unexpected for the EMS.
The PowerWorld [12] simulator is used to verify the attack
vectors from the proposed model. Additionally, the model with
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the lossless DC power system is simulated in order to verify
that there is no overloading with the attacked load and new
generation data during both normal and contingency period.
The figure 8(a) shows that when line 3 (between buses 2 and 3)
trips there is no overloading among any of the lines. However,
Fig. 8(b) shows the the scenario with the new generation and
actual load, where we see when line 3 trips, line 6 becomes
overloaded by 13.5%. Conclusively acquiring the same result
shown in the model provided.
In this case study, it is observed that in order to launch a
successful UFDI attack on CA, the attacker needs to attack the
measurements that are distributed in at least 3 different buses.
Having in mind that the amount of change in the loads should
be at least 10% of the original value.
Case Study 3:
In this example, the attacker’s objective is to launch a false
data injection attack to overload at least 25% of the total
lines (4 lines) within overloading amount of 2% of the rated
capacity at least. The attacker can change the load up to 50%
of the actual value. The execution of the model corresponding
to this example returns sat along with the assignments to
different variables of the model. From the assignments, we
find that:
• To achieve the attacker’s goals, it is required to execute
UFDI attack on states 3, 4, 7, and 8.
• In order to keep this attack undetected, it is required to
alter measurements in buses 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 9.
• From the attack vector, we see that to attack the states,
loads at buses 3, 5, and 9 are increased by 0.162 pu,
0.012, and 0.003 pu, respectively, and loads at bus 2 and
4 are reduced by 0.071 pu and 0.106 pu, respectively.
• According to the attacked load scenario, the system
calculates the new set of generation running the SCOPF
algorithm. Generator 2,3, and 6 change their output from
0.284 pu to 0.1 pu, from 0.944 pu to 1.112 pu, and
from 1.220 pu to 1.235 pu, respectively. The new set
of dispatch has a generation cost of $378, which is less
than the pre-attack SCOPF generation cost.
• With the false load data and the new set of generations,
all the expected line power flows calculated by EMS are
within the rated capacity during the normal condition and
the contingency conditions.
• However, with the actual loads and new non-optimal
generations, the line power flows are within the rated
capacity during the normal condition. However, when line
7 trips, the power flow through the line 1, 2, 5 and 6 get
overloaded by 2%, 2%, 3.75%, and 31.5%.
Again we verify this attack vectors using PowerWorld. We
see that there is no overloading with the attacked load and new
generation data during both normal and contingency period.
The figure 9(a) shows that when line 7 (bus 4-5) trips there
is no overloading among any of the lines. However, Fig. 9(b)
shows the scenario with the new generations and actual loads,
where we see when line 7 trips, line 1, 2, 5, and 6 get
overloaded by 2%, 2%, 3.75%, and 31.5%. We also get the
same result from our proposed model.
IV. EVALUATION
The results of the scalability evaluation of the proposed
model is presented in this section. We evaluate the perfor-
mance of the proposed model with respect to successful UFDI
attacks on different bus states. We use attackability, defined as
the number of states which can be attacked (i.e., infected by
UFDI attacks) over the total number of states, as the evaluation
metric.
A. Methodology
We evaluate the performance of our proposed model by
analyzing the attack space under different scenarios consid-
ering the attacker’s capabilities, attacker’s target, and security
measures. To perform this evaluation, we use IEEE 14-bus
test system [10] which consists of 14 buses, 20 transmission
lines, and 54 possible measurements as shown in Fig.7. In our
evaluation, we mainly consider three kinds of adversaries with
different capabilities to distribute the attack to different buses
: (i) capability to attack a maximum of 5 buses at a time,
(ii) capability to attack a maximum of 6 buses at a time, (iii)
capability to attack maximum 7 buses at a time. For all of
these adversaries, we consider the same resource constraints.
An adversary can attack a maximum of 25 measurements at a
time.
B. Evaluation Results and Discussion
1) Performance with respect to Attacker’s Capability:
Fig.10(a) shows the attacker’s capability i.e., , the percentage
of false load that can be injected in buses in different cases
considering the attacker’s type. Here, we consider the 14-
bus test system. The attacker is capable of changing the bus
load data from 10% to 50% of the original ones. According
to the experience, we observe that for the attacker with the
capability of attacking a maximum of 5 buses has less number
of attack vectors than the attackers with the capability of
attacking maximum 6 buses or 7 buses. For the first attacker
increasing the attacker’s capability does not increase the attack
space much; however, for the other two attackers, the size
of attack space becomes almost double while increasing the
capability from 40% to 50%. However, from 10% to 40% of
the attacked load, there is no significant increase in the attack
space. According to the experiment results, we observe that
the attack space is sufficiently large even with changing 10%
of the load.
2) Attack Space with respect to the Attacker’s Goal:
Percentage of overload of the Lines Fig.10(b) shows one of
the goals of the attackers i.e., , the percentage of overloading
of the targeted lines, in different cases with respect to the
attacker’s capabilities. The attacker’s target is to overload at
least 5% of the total lines (1 line) and have the capability
of injecting up-to 30% of false load data. Here we evaluate
different scenarios with 2% to 10% as the overloading amount
of those lines. According to the experiment results, we observe
with the increase of the attacker’s target to overload more, the
number of the attack vectors decreases almost linearly. The
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Fig. 10. Evaluation of the model’s performance : (a) Impact of attacker’s capability (percentage of attacked load), (b) Percentage of line overloading amount,
and (c) percentage of overloaded lines
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Fig. 11. Model performance on secured measurements with 20% attacker’s capability (a) Impact of randomly secured measurements, (b) bus frequency in
attack vectors and (c) impact of analytically secured measurements.
results seem logical as overloading lines with 2% is easier
than overloading lines by 10%. Besides with the target of
overloading with a higher percentage, an attacker with the
capability of attacking maximum 7 buses has more attack
vectors than others.
percentage of overloaded lines Figure 10(c) shows one
of the goals of the attackers i.e., , the percentage of the
overloaded lines in different cases with respect to the attacker’s
capabilities. The attacker’s target is to overload lines by at least
2% of the rated capacity with injecting up-to 50% of false
load data in the measurements. Here, we evaluate different
scenarios with 10% to 25% of the lines (1 line to 4 lines) to be
overloaded after any contingency. According to the experiment
results, we observe that with the increase in attacker’s target to
overload lines, the number of attack vectors decreases rapidly.
Satisfying constraints to overload only 1 line is much easier
for the model than to overload more lines. The attack space
becomes too small when the attack target is to overload 2 to 4
lines. However, overloading 25% of the lines (5 lines) is not
possible with the current attack attributes.
3) Securing the Measurements: Securing the measurements
limits the attacker capability to launch an FDI attack to the
power system. As to bypass the BDD algorithm, the attacker
may need to change multiple measurements which may not be
possible if one or some of them are secured. In the following
sections, the impact of the secured measurements is discussed.
Impact of Randomly Secured Measurements: To increase
the resiliency of the system, the measurements must have
data integrity and need to be secured from all kinds of
cyberattacks. Thus, we study the impact of the percentage of
secured measurements on the attack space of this example.
We explored the attack space by changing the percentage of
secured measurements from 0% to 40% of the total mea-
surements. Again, we consider two cases where the attacker
has the capability to inject 20% and 50% of false data,
respectively. The target is to overload at least 5% of the
lines with minimum 2% overloading. Fig.10(a) and Fig.11(a)
show these two cases when the measurements are selected and
secured randomly. From both of the figures, it is observed that
securing the measurements reduces the attack space almost
linearly. However, to make the system completely secured
from any UFDI attack, for both of the cases, at least 40% of
the measurements need to be secured when they are chosen
randomly.
Frequency of Compromised Buses: Due to different con-
figurations, capabilities and connectivity of the buses, attack-
ing the measurements located at some specific buses gives
comparatively more attack vectors than others. To explore
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Fig. 12. Model performance on secured measurements with 50% attacker’s capability (a) Impact of randomly secured measurements, (b) bus frequency in
attack vectors and (c) impact of analytically secured measurements.
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Fig. 13. Heat-map on line overloading scenarios with attacker’s capability of attacking measurements at (a) maximum 5 buses, (b) maximum 6 buses, and
(c) maximum 7 buses.
this relationship, we analyzed the attack vectors resulted from
the two studies as discussed in the earlier section where the
attackers can inject up to 20% and 50% of the load data
respectively to overload at least 5% of the total lines by 2% of
their respected rated capacity. Thus, analyzing all the attack
vectors, we calculate the recurrence of each measurement in
the attack vectors. From Fig.10(b) and Fig.11(b), it is clear
that measurements at some specific buses are more common.
From both of the bar charts, we see that compromising the
measurements at Bus 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 are giving more
attack vectors than other do. From these results, it is clear that
buses with both generator and load are more frequent in the
attack space than others. Besides, the neighboring load buses
connected to these buses are also more common in the attack
scenarios. Hence, as the attacker’s target is not the increase in
the generation cost, the buses with the lower generation cost
are more frequent in the attacks scenarios.
Impact of Analytically Secured Measurements : In this part,
the buses with higher frequencies are secured first and the
impact is studied under the same attack attributes. Thus, from
the sorted list of the highly affected buses, we secure 1, 2,
3, and 4 most common buses in the attacks respectively and
then analyze the attack vectors again for each of the cases.
For the first case (with 20% data injection), only securing
the measurements at bus 4, which is the most frequent one,
makes all the attack vectors invalid. Thus, with this approach
securing only 7% of the total measurements makes the system
robust from all the UFDI attacks on SCOPF, whereas 40% was
needed if it was done randomly. In the second case where the
attacker is more resourceful with 50% data injection capability,
there are more attack vectors. Again, securing only the most
frequent buses reduces the attack spaces drastically. Fig.12(c)
shows securing only the measurements at bus 4 (7% of total
measurements) reduces the attacks space by almost 90% where
30% is needed when it is done in arbitrary.
4) Line Overload Heatmap: : Fig.13 shows the heat map
of the line overloading for 3 different cases. In the x-axis, it
shows the lines that need to trip to make others overloaded
and in the y-axis, it shows the lines get overloaded. Fig.13(a)
shows the heatmap when the attacker has the capability of
attacking measurements distributed at a maximum of 5 buses.
It is clear from the figure that for most of the attack vectors
line 6 gets overloaded when the other lines trip; there are
also some other scenarios when line 3 and 9 get overloaded.
Fig.13(b) shows the scenarios of line overloading when the
attacker can attack up to 6 buses at a time. Now, it gives
additional scenarios where line 1, 2 and 5 get overloaded
as well. Finally, Fig. 13(c) represents the scenarios attacking
measurements distributed at up to 7 buses. With this capability,
now the attacker can overload line 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9 and also
12
15. All these lines except 6, get overloaded only when line
6, 7 or 10 trips which are mainly connected to the generation
bus. Thus, making these lines physically more robust reduces
the probability of the attacker success.
V. RELATED WORK
Cyber attacks on power grids have been considered in
literature over the last few years [13], [14]. Nowadays, Un-
detected False Data Injection (UFDI) attacks are one of the
most researched and continuing issues on the cybersecurity
analysis of power systems. It mainly considers the concept of
stealthy attacks against the system control loop. The idea of
such stealthy attacks is first introduced in [4], and continued
succeeding in [15]. The authors represented different cases to
explain the attack. One of them was the attacker’s limitation of
the access to resources and sensors/meters to alter them. They
considered the adversary has comprehensive knowledge about
the network and the targets are arbitrary and specific. In the
usual circumstance, finding the attack vector for a closed-loop
system is an NP-complete problem. Therefore, the authors
performed a few heuristic procedures to obtain attack vectors.
Vukovic et al. introduced several security metrics to cal-
culate the weight of individual buses and the expense of
compromising different measurements acknowledging the vul-
nerability of the system connectivity [16]. Kin Sou et al.
proposed that an l1 relaxation-based method gives an accurate
optimal solution of the attack vector generation problem [17].
UFDI attacks with partial or inadequate knowledge of the
power system equipment properties are presented in [18],
[19]. It is also shown in [20] that an adversary can launch
UFDI attacks despite not knowing the topology. The authors
estimated the linear composition of the topology from the
measurements to initialize a UFDI attack based on that. The
work [21] shows the competition between an intruder and a
defender concerning the effects of UFDI attacks on energy
markets.
In [22], the algebraic forms of undetected topology attacks
in power grids are introduced. The idea of anonymous attacks
is proposed in [23], where the grid operator might be able
to detect the presence of bad data, but cannot recognize
the compromised sensor accurately. In [24], the authors
introduced load redistribution attacks which were discussed
later for situations where the attacker has inadequate knowl-
edge [25]. Rahman et al. introduced a formal model which
verify stealthy attacks comprehensively on state estimation
considering different attack attributes concurrently [26]. Later
in [27], they assessed the effect of stealthy attacks on the
economic performance of the power system, considering the
interrelation between SE and OPF and topology poisoning-
based stealthy attacks in [28]. In [11] the authors investigated
the feasibility and economic influence of stealthy attacks using
Simulink and formal model.
In formal modeling, few works tried to use Simulink based
design as well. In [29], the authors suggest a verifier for a
contract-based scheme, which is created using simulink that
certifies the accuracy of the Simulink model. In [30], the
authors used Simulink based modeling to verify the control
system properties. They used Why3, a platform for deductive
program verification. In [31], Bobba et al. proposed that
defending a set of measurements which assure observability
can detect UFDI attacks. In [32], the authors suggested a
greedy suboptimal algorithm that can determine a measure-
ment subset, which is immune to false data injection.
Recently, Kang et al. [33] proposed an FDI attack on
contingency analysis of power system, where the target was to
mislead the operational cost only. However, if the system runs
SCOPF on false data, both physical and economic impacts
are there. The authors did not consider any consequences as
physical damage in their work. In [34], Chu at el. studied the
vulnerability of power system by targeting a specific line when
another line trips. They only considered few specific probable
cases and the false data is injected to the state estimator instead
of the true measurements ignoring the security/accessibility of
the measurements. Chu at el. studied the vulnerability of power
system by targeting a specific line when another line trips [34].
The proposed framework considers only few probable cases
and the false data is injected directly to the state estimator
instead of the true measurements. They ignored the impacts
of the security/accessibility of the measurements on the attack
vector.
Unlike the above mentioned works, we propose a compre-
hensive formal framework to synthesize the stealthy attack
vectors that can compromise the solution by CA, providing
a false notion of security in contingencies. This synthesis
model considers a complete attack path, from altering the
measurements to their impact path down to CA, and can
automatically identify the critical threat space.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work we have shown that impact of stealthy attacks
on SE propagates to SCOPF, which causes incorrect dispatch
decisions, leading to transmission line overloading in the case
of contingencies. In such cases, the grid can face the tripping
of more transmission lines, and thus power outage. We have
presented a formal model that allows us to find such SCOPF-
affected threats and its causes (attack vectors). We have
analyzed the feasibility of these attacks with respect to IEEE
bus systems considering different attack environments. The
results shows that our proposed tool can explore the potential
attack space efficiently. We have also leveraged PowerWorld to
verify the proposed model. The proposed formal model would
be useful to provably identify and analyze the resiliency of
a grid’s correct and efficient operation against cyber attacks,
which will assist in applying necessary security measures for
a secure and dependable system.
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APPENDIX
A. DC Power Flow Model
In DC model, the first assumption is to consider the trans-
mission line resistances (RL) insignificant compared to the line
reactances. This means lines are considered purely inductive.
Considering RL as resistance, GL as conductance, XL as
reactance, BL as susceptance, ZL as impedance and YL as
the admittance of a transmission line L:
GL =
RL
R2L +X
2
L
≈ 0
BL =
−XL
R2L +X
2
L
≈ − 1
XL
ZL =≈ j.XL & YL ≈ j.BL
(37)
The second assumption is that the voltage of the buses is
considered as fixed at 1.0 per unit (pu). The only variables
of the system are the states of the buses which are the phase
angles and those can be calculated from the different sensor
measurements using state estimation. Then, considering all the
assumptions, the phasor (θj) of the voltage (Vj) at bus j is
considered as: Vj ≈ 1∠θj .
Line admittance is the reciprocal of the line reactance.
The phase differences between two connected buses are small
enough to results in the linearization of sine and cosine
functions. Thus:
sin(θi − θj) ≈ θi − θj
cos(θi − θj) ≈ 1
(38)
Let the admittance of the line connecting buses i and j is
Yij , thus the power flow through the transmission line these
buses is calculated by: Pij = Yij(θi − θj) where θi and θj
are the phase angles of bus i and j respectively. Considering
the power flow constraint, the algebraic sum of the power
flow incoming to a bus should be zero. Assuming the system
has n buses, the constraint can be modeled using a linear
system equation B[θ] = [P], where [B] is a n-1 dimensional
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square matrix, P is a matrix with the same size of B where
its elements show the net power demand at a bus, and [θ] is
a column vector of unknown phases corresponding to the bus
voltage phasors. There is a reference bus for which the phase
angle θi = 0. The model solves the unknown phase angles,
given the power amounts (i.e., generation and/or load) at all the
buses and the line reactances. This linear model gives the base
for DC state estimation described in the following section.
B. Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs)
Line Outage Distribution Factors (LODFs) represent the
sensitivity of a power system during a contingency condition
i.e. line outage [35]. Power system is a complex network and
all of the elements have their own operating limit. Thus, if
power flow through any line exceeds its rating, circuit breaker
will trip the line to protect the rest of the system. On other
hand, there might be also some natural or accidental events
that may also be the reason behind the contingency. During
the outage, pre-outage power flowing through the affected line
is distributed to the other lines with respect to a sensitivity
factor matrix that is called Line Outage Distribution Factors
(LODFs). Each elements of the matrix represent if one line is
tripped what percent of the power of the affected line will be
shared by the another line. Thus, LODFs are used to calculate
the linear impact of contingencies in power system simulator.
Therefore, in a power system during the outage of line2, post
contingency power flow of line1 is
Powerpostline1 = Power
pre
line1
+ LODFline1,line2 × Powerpreline2
where Powerpreline1 and Power
pre
line2
are the pre-outage power
flows of line1 and line2 respectively and LODFline1,line2 is
LODF of line1 with respect to the outage of line2.
In our work to calculate the LODF matrix of a power
system [36], firstly we calculate the Ybus matrix as
Ybus =

y11 y12 .... y1n
y21 y22 .... y2n
.... .... .... ....
.... .... .... ....
yn1 yn2 .... ynn
 (39)
yij = − 1
zij
yii =
n∑
i=1 i 6=j
yij
(40)
where zij is the impedance of the line between bus i and j.
We consider bus 1 as the slack bus and thus eliminating the
1st row and 1st column from the Ybus matrix, we get
Yeliminate =

y22 y23 .... y2n
y32 y33 .... y1n
.... .... .... ....
.... .... .... ....
yn2 yn3 .... ynn
 (41)
The sensitivity matrix is
X =
[
0 0
0 Y −1eliminate
]
(42)
Finally, the line outage distribution factor (LODF) of line
line1 due to the outage of the line line2 can be calculated by
the following equation
LODF(line1,line2) =
zij
zkl
(Xil −Xjl −Xik +Xjk)
zkl − (Xii +Xjj − 2Xij (43)
C. Case Study Input
Table VIII shows the primary input data (partial) for our
example case studies.
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TABLE VIII
INPUT (PARTIAL) FOR CASE STUDY 1
# Topology (Line) Information
# (line no, from bus, to bus, admittance, line capacity, knowledge?, in
true topology?, in core?, secured?)
1 1 2 16.90 0.65
2 1 5 4.48 0.51
3 2 3 5.05 0.15
.........................................
.........................................
19 12 13 5.00 0.35
20 14 13 2.87 0.55
# Bus Types (bus no, is generator?, is load?)
1 1 0
2 1 1
3 1 1
.........
.........
13 0 1
14 0 1
# Generator Information (bus no, max generation, min generation, cost
coefficient)
1 0.80 0.10 20 220
2 0.80 0.10 20 150
...........................
6 1.80 0.10 20 100
8 0.40 0.10 20 250
# Load Information (bus no, existing load, max load, min load)
2 0.217 0.60 0.01
3 0.80 1.50 0.01
........................
........................
13 0.135 0.35 0.01
14 0.149 0.35 0.01
# Measurement Information
# (measurement no, measurement taken?, secured?, can attacker alter?)
1 1 1 0
2 1 0 1
3 1 0 1
.............
.............
.............
53 1 1 1
54 1 0 1
# Cost Constraint
382
# Attacker’s Resource Limitation (measurements, buses)
20 3
# Maximum percent of delta load
20
# % of minimum Overloading amount, % of lines to be overloaded
5 5
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